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How the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Should Apply Wynne
by Michael S. Knoll and Ruth Mason
In October the U.S. Supreme Court remanded First
Marblehead Corp. v. Massachusetts Commissioner of Revenue1
so that the Massachusetts courts could apply the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decision in Comptroller of the Treasury of
Maryland v. Wynne.2 First Marblehead represents the first
opportunity after Wynne for a state’s highest court to recon-
sider a tax discrimination case.3 In this article, we show how
Wynne applies in First Marblehead.
First Marblehead: Statutory Argument
For the tax years in question (2004-2006), First Marble-
head Corp. (FMC) was a publicly traded corporation with
its principal place of business in Boston. FMC was the
principal tax reporting entity for itself and several other
related entities. Gate Holdings Inc., one of those related
entities, was a limited liability company domiciled in Mas-
sachusetts. FMC and Gate were involved in securitizing
student loans. Gate, whose taxes are at the center of the
dispute, held beneficial interests in trusts that held student
loans. Those beneficial interests were essentially the only
property Gate held, and substantially all of Gate’s income
was from interest on the student loans in which it held
beneficial interests. As described by the Massachusetts
court, Gate ‘‘was essentially a holding company with no
employees, payroll, tangible assets or office space.’’4
Gate and FMC were long embroiled in Massachusetts tax
disputes. However, by the time the case reached the state’s
supreme court, the only unresolved issue involved Gate.
Under Massachusetts law, Gate was entitled to apportion its
income between Massachusetts and other states. Massachu-
setts law provides that a financial institution can apportion
its income based on the average of the institution’s receipts,
payroll, and property factors. Each factor is determined by
dividing the institution’s in-state receipts, payroll, and
property by its total worldwide receipts, payroll, and prop-
erty.
Because Gate had no employees, its payroll factor
dropped out of the formula, and thus Gate’s income was
1First Marblehead Corp. v. Mass. Commissioner of Revenue, No.
14-1422 (Oct. 13, 2015), vacating and remanding.
2575 U.S. ___ (2015) (all internal citations are to the slip opinion);
see also Maryland State Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 64 A.3d
453 (Md. 2013).
3The Supreme Court issued Wynne on May 18, 2015, and the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued its opinion in First
Marblehead on January 28, 2015.
4First Marblehead Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 470 Mass., 497
(S. Ct. Mass. 2015). First Marblehead, slip op. at 5.
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In this special report, Knoll and
Mason discuss how the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court should apply
Wynne when it hears on remand First
Marblehead v. Commissioner of Rev-
enue. The authors conclude that when
it originally heard the case, the Massa-
chusetts court mistakenly considered,
as part of its internal consistency analy-
sis, whether Gate Holdings Inc. experienced double state
taxation. As developed by the U.S. Supreme Court and most
recently applied in Wynne, the internal consistency test is not
concerned with actual double taxation that may arise from
the interaction of different states’ laws. Rather, the test is
designed to determine whether the challenged state’s law
alone discriminates against interstate commerce.The authors
show how this standard applies to the challenged Massachu-
setts apportionment rules, and they conclude that in order to
ascertain the constitutionality of the challenged Massachu-
setts law, the Massachusetts court must determine how the
other states would tax Gate if the other states applied Mas-
sachusetts law for non-domiciled taxpayers.
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apportioned to Massachusetts based on the average of its
receipts and property factors. Gate’s receipts factor was
roughly 2 percent because roughly 2 percent of the borrow-
ers on the loans it held resided in Massachusetts.
By the time the case reached the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, the only issue remaining in First Marblehead
was how to calculate Gate’s Massachusetts property factor.
As the court described the issue:
We must determine whether the loan portfolios that
represented substantially all of Gate’s property for the
tax years at issue should be treated as having been
located in whole or in part within the Common-
wealth, and thus included in the numerator of Gate’s
property factor fraction, or outside of the Common-
wealth, and therefore excluded from the numerator
and included only in the denominator.5
The Massachusetts commissioner of revenue argued that
all of the loans should be allocated to Massachusetts for the
purpose of calculating Gate’s property factor (property fac-
tor 100 percent), thereby yielding an apportionment frac-
tion of 51 percent and thus subjecting 51 percent of Gate’s
income to tax in Massachusetts.6 In contrast, FMC and
Gate argued that for the purpose of calculating the property
fraction, all of the loans should be considered property
outside Massachusetts (property factor 0), thereby render-
ing only 1 percent of Gate’s income subject to tax in
Massachusetts.7 The tax difference for the three years using
the 51 percent rather than the 1 percent allocation fraction
was more than $4 million.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determined
that the relevant rule for apportioning Gate’s loans was the
following8:
In the case of a loan which is assigned by the taxpayer
to a place without the commonwealth which is not a
regular place of business, it shall be presumed, subject
to rebuttal by the taxpayer on a showing supported by
the preponderance of evidence, that the preponder-
ance of substantive contacts regarding the loan
occurred within the commonwealth if, at the time the
loan was made the taxpayer’s commercial
domicile . . . was within the commonwealth.9
In other words, Massachusetts presumptively assigns a
loan to Massachusetts if, when the loan was made, the owner
of the loan was domiciled in Massachusetts and the owner
had no regular place of business anywhere.
Relying on the phrase ‘‘at the time the loan was made,’’
Gate argued that the presumption applies only in the con-
text of an original lender. Gate argued that because it was
not the original lender (Gate had acquired its interest in the
loans after the loans were originated), the presumption did
not apply. In contrast with Gate’s view, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the purpose of the
phrase ‘‘at the time the loan was made’’ is to resolve any
ambiguity were the taxpayer to change domicile after the
loan was originated.10 That is, if the taxpayer lacks a regular
place of business, the statute presumptively allocates the
loans to Massachusetts if the taxpayer’s commercial domi-
cile was Massachusetts at the time of origination, even if the
taxpayer moves its commercial domicile after origination.
Accordingly, the Massachusetts supreme court concluded
that the presumption applies to Gate.
Having lost its argument on whether the presumption
should apply, Gate then sought to overcome the presump-
tion by showing that a ‘‘preponderance of substantive con-
tacts regarding the loan’’ occurred outside Massachusetts.11
The relevant Massachusetts law for ascertaining the state in
which a preponderance of substantive contacts for a loan is:
To determine the state in which the preponderance of
substantive contacts relating to a loan have occurred,
the facts and circumstances regarding the loan at issue
shall be reviewed on a case-by-case basis and consid-
eration shall be given to such activities as the solicita-
tion, investigation, negotiation, approval and admin-
istration of the loan.12
The court concluded that administration was the only
one of the five factors that could possibly apply to Gate
‘‘because all the other factors listed relate to the origination
of loans and Gate played no role in loan origination.’’13 The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court further held that
none of the activities that Gate or affiliated loan servicers
provided constituted ‘‘administration’’ as defined by the
statute. This effectively knocked out the last of the five
factors in the facts and circumstances test, and, as a result,
the court concluded that for purposes of Massachusetts tax
law, the loans had ‘‘no ‘substantive contacts’‘‘ with any
5First Marblehead, slip op., at 12-13.
6With a property factor of 100 percent, the apportionment fraction
would be 51 percent, the arithmetic mean of 2 percent and 100
percent.
7With a property factor of 0, the apportionment fraction would be
1 percent, the arithmetic mean of 2 percent and 0.
8The court’s conclusion that this rule applied was based on its
holding that Gate had no ‘‘regular place of business’’ in Massachusetts
or elsewhere to which the loans could be assigned.
9Mass. G.L. Ann. 63 section 2A(e)(vi)(B).
10In rejecting Gate’s interpretation, the court reasoned as follows:
‘‘[The reading urged by Gate] would leave open the possibility that
loans qualifying as property of the taxpayer could exist without being
assigned anywhere. This is clearly an unintended and ultimately absurd
result.’’ First Marblehead, slip op, at 17.
11 Mass. G.L. Ann. 63 section 2A(c)(vi)(C).
12Id.
13First Marblehead, slip op., at 19. Gate might have been better off
arguing that the time of origination language applies to loans whether
held by the originator or not and so the location of property does not
change with ownership. Anyway, we conduct our constitutional analy-
sis based on the statute as interpreted and enforced by Massachusetts.
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state.14 Accordingly, Gate had not overcome the statutory
presumption, and the loans were properly assigned to Gate’s
commercial domicile of Massachusetts. The court therefore
calculated the Massachusetts property factor to be 100
percent, which yielded an apportionment fraction of 51
percent. Thus, for Gate the rebuttable statutory presump-
tion effectively could not be rebutted, and so all of the loans
were considered Massachusetts property, which resulted in
Gate owing Massachusetts $4 million in tax.
Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the commerce
clause of the U.S. Constitution to promote a single national
marketplace in which taxpayers residing in different states
can compete on a level playing field.15 Specifically, the U.S.
Supreme Court has interpreted the clause to prohibit states
from discriminating against out-of-state parties and to re-
quire apportionment formulas to be fair. Gate argued that
the Massachusetts tax (as interpreted by the Massachusetts
courts) violated the dormant commerce clause because it
was not fairly apportioned. Although the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court purported to apply the internal
consistency test and found the Massachusetts tax to be
internally consistent and therefore not unconstitutional,16
on petition for writ of certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the case so that the Massachusetts
court could reconsider it in light of Wynne.17
Wynne: Reinvigorating Internal Consistency
In Wynne a sharply divided Court, relying on the internal
consistency test, struck down a Maryland state income tax
on the ground that the tax violated the dormant commerce
clause. Prior to Wynne the Court evoked the test in eight
cases and used it to strike down a state statute in three.
Nevertheless, the Court had been narrowing the test in
recent years and had not rejected a state tax for failing the
internal consistency test for roughly 30 years. In striking
down the Maryland statute and reinvigorating the test, the
Wynne Court relied on an amicus brief we wrote and an-
other, similar brief submitted by eight tax economists and
principally written by Alan Viard.18 The two briefs provided
the economic underpinnings for the internal consistency
test, and the Court described the economic analysis in these
two briefs as ‘‘undisputed.’’19
In urging the Court to strike down the Maryland statute
because it was internally inconsistent, we argued that, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, the dormant commerce
clause does not prevent double taxation as such, but rather it
prevents discrimination against interstate commerce. Double
taxation is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for
discrimination. As we have explained at length in a series of
articles, avoiding discrimination requires that state taxes be
uniform.20 A source tax is uniform if it applies at the same
rate and on the same base to all taxpayers with income
sourced in that jurisdiction, regardless of their residence. A
residence tax is uniform if it applies at the same rate and on
the same base to all income earned by taxpayers resident in
that state, regardless of the source of their income.21 Appor-
tionment rules are sourcing rules, so under our analysis, to
avoid discrimination, a state must apply the same allocation
rules to residents and nonresidents (or domiciliaries and
non-domiciliaries). We showed in our brief and in several
short pieces published after we submitted our brief that the
internal consistency test is an easy way to check for unifor-
mity in a state’s tax rates.22
Twenty years ago in Jefferson Lines, the Supreme Court
gave its clearest and most widely cited statement about how
to apply the internal consistency test, writing that:
internal consistency is preserved when the imposition
of a tax identical to the one in question by every other
State would add no burden to interstate commerce
that intrastate commerce would not also bear. This
test asks nothing about the degree of economic reality
reflected by the tax, but simply looks to the structure
of the tax at issue to see whether its identical applica-
tion by every state in the Union would place interstate
commerce at a disadvantage as compared with com-
merce intrastate.23
14Id. at 904.
15See H.P. Hood & Sons Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949);
Okla. Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995);
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); and Armco Inc. v. Hardesty,
467 U.S. 638 (1984).
16The way the Massachusetts court applied the test accorded
neither with Wynne nor earlier precedent on the internal consistency
test. Contrary to Wynne and other precedent, the Massachusetts court
checked only whether Gate suffered actual double state taxation. As we
explain later, that is an improper application of internal consistency.
17First Marblehead, supra note 1.
18Brief for Michael S. Knoll and Ruth Mason as Amici Curiae;
Brief for Tax Economists as Amici Curiae. In addition to these two
briefs, friends of the court filed 12 other briefs in Wynne, including the
solicitor general, who filed an amicus brief for the United States in
support of Maryland.
19Wynne, at 22.
20Mason and Knoll, ‘‘Waiting for Perseus: A Sur-Reply to Profes-
sors Graetz and Warren,’’ 67 Tax L. Rev. 375 (2014) [hereinafter
Waiting]; Mason and Knoll, ‘‘A Brief Sur-Reply to Professors Graetz
and Warren,’’ 123 Yale L.J. Online 1 (2013); and Mason and Knoll,
‘‘What Is Tax Discrimination?’’ 121 Yale L.J. 1014 (2012).
21In effect, uniformity requires that states tax their residents on
their domestic-source income by applying both the tax they assess on
their residents’ out-of-state income and the tax they assess on nonresi-
dents’ in-state income.
22Knoll and Mason, ‘‘Comptroller v.Wynne: Internal Consistency, A
National Marketplace, and Limits on State Sovereignty to Tax,’’ 163 U.
of Penn. L. Rev. Online 267 (2015); Knoll and Mason, ‘‘Wynne: It’s Not
About Double Taxation,’’ State Tax Notes, Feb. 16, 2015, p. 413
(2015); Brief of Knoll and Mason.
23Jefferson Lines Inc., 514 U.S. at 185.
Special Report
(Footnote continued in next column.)
State Tax Notes, December 21, 2015 923
For more State Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
(C
) T
ax A
nalysts 2015. A
ll rights reserved. T
ax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
Thus, the internal consistency test directs a court to
assume that every state enacts the challenged state’s tax
regime, and then it asks whether, under such hypothetical
harmonization, interstate commerce bears more tax than
purely in-state commerce. Notwithstanding that it pur-
ported to apply the internal consistency test, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court did not apply the test properly
in First Marblehead. Rather than hypothetically assuming
that all states used Massachusetts’s apportionment rules, the
Massachusetts court instead looked to see whether Gate
experienced actual double taxation. We assume that was
why the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the
court’s opinion, and remanded the case for further consid-
eration.
In applying the internal consistency test on remand in
First Marblehead, the Massachusetts court should assume
that all other states enact the Massachusetts income tax law
and then the court should determine whether the tax bur-
den on cross-border commerce is higher than that on purely
in-state commerce. That is the test from Jefferson Lines, and
the Supreme Court endorsed it in Wynne.24 Although the
internal consistency test strikes some as counterintuitive
because it is counterfactual, not only has the Supreme Court
unequivocally endorsed the approach, but economic analy-
sis shows that the internal consistency test works better than
raw intuition and better than comparing absolute tax rates
in determining whether a state discriminates against inter-
state taxation.25
Note that while the internal consistency test asks whether
interstate commerce bears more tax than purely domestic
commerce under the counterfactual assumption that all
states apply the challenged rule, the test does not rule out
actual double tax. The test may ‘‘pass’’ state tax regimes
notwithstanding that the taxpayer at issue is subject to
actual double taxation. Likewise, the test may ‘‘fail’’ state tax
regimes even though the taxpayer suffered no actual double
tax. For example, as the Supreme Court noted in Wynne, an
internally consistent state tax regime that taxed only on a
source basis would not violate the dormant commerce
clause.26 At the same time, an internally consistent state tax
regime that taxed only on a residence basis would also not
violate the dormant commerce clause.27 If different states
adopted each regime, cross-border taxpayers might suffer
actual double taxation, even though no state would have
violated the dormant commerce clause. That is because
internal consistency is a test for discrimination, not double
taxation. The form the test takes makes it possible to deter-
mine whether there is a discriminatory effect from a simple
comparison. The alternative but direct way of making such
a discrimination determination would involve complex eco-
nomic analysis, a task we undertook in some of our earlier
work.28 Below we provide a simple example.
The internal consistency test is easy to apply when, as in
Wynne, the taxpayer challenges the state’s rate structure.
Brian and Karen Wynne challenged the constitutionality of
a Maryland tax regime that imposed a 3.2 percent tax on
both the domestic (Td) and outbound incomes (To) of
residents and a 1.25 percent tax on the inbound incomes of
nonresidents (Ti). We illustrate the tax regime challenged in
Wynne in Table 1. The left column represents Maryland
residents and the right column nonresidents. Residents and
nonresidents can earn income in Maryland (bottom row) or
outside Maryland (top row). Maryland will tax Maryland
residents at 3.2 percent on their Maryland income (bottom
left quadrant) and on their out-of-state income (top left
quadrant); Maryland will also tax nonresidents at 1.25
percent on their Maryland income (bottom right quadrant).
Maryland, however, because of a lack of nexus, does not and
cannot tax the non-Maryland income of nonresidents (the
top right quadrant).
The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Maryland tax
as violating the dormant commerce clause because the
Maryland tax failed the internal consistency test. When we
counterfactually assume that every other state adopts Mary-
land’s tax regime, cross-border economic activities suffer
more tax than purely domestic activities, a point illustrated
in Table 2:
The shaded quadrants represent cross-border activity.
For the two cross-border quadrants, the assumption that all24Wynne, at 21-26.
25See authors’ brief cited in supra note 18 and articles cited supra
note 20.
26Wynne, at 22-23.
27Wynne, at 22-23. 28See articles cited in supra note 18.
Table 1.
Challenged Maryland Tax Regime
Maryland
Resident
Resident of
Another State
Activity in Another State Outbound Tax
To = 3.2%
N/A
Activity in Maryland Domestic Tax
Td = 3.2%
Inbound Tax
Ti = 1.25%
Table 2.
Challenged Maryland Tax Under
The Internal Consistency Test
Tested State
Resident
(Marylander)
Resident of
Another State
Activity in Another State Ti + To = 4.45% Td = 3.2%
Activity in Tested State
(Maryland)
Td = 3.2% Ti +To = 4.45%
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states adopt the Maryland tax system implies that the in-
come in these quadrants is taxed more heavily when it
crosses borders than when it does not. In the top left
quadrant, the inbound tax (Ti) combines with the out-
bound tax (To) to increase the burden on Marylanders’
out-of-state activities, and in the lower right quadrant, the
inbound tax (Ti) combines with the outbound tax (To) to
increase the burden on non-Marylanders’ activities in Mary-
land. Accordingly, the in-state income of residents is subject
to the domestic tax only (Td), whereas cross-border income
is subject to both the inbound tax (Ti) and the outbound tax
(To). Put simply, the Maryland tax regime is internally
inconsistent because interstate income bears more tax (4.45
percent — shaded regions) than purely in-state income (3.2
percent — unshaded regions).29
We have long argued that a court cannot determine
whether a state’s tax rate regime discriminates against inter-
state commerce unless the court analyzes how the state taxes
both inbound and outbound income.30 Specifically, to as-
certain whether a state’s tax structure is internally consis-
tent, a court must compare the state’s rate on residents’
domestic income with the sum of the state’s rates on resi-
dents’ out-of-state and nonresidents’ in-state income. The
state’s tax rate regime is internally consistent only if the
domestic tax rate equals or exceeds the total of the state’s
outgoing plus incoming tax rates. We further argued that
courts cannot view source taxes in isolation from residence
taxes lest courts miss discrimination that results from the
interaction of source and residence taxes.31 Application of
the internal consistency test forces courts to take a compre-
hensive view of the challenges raised against state tax re-
gimes and therefore avoids error.
Applying Wynne to First Marblehead
The internal consistency test can be more difficult to
apply in a case such as First Marblehead, in which the
challenge is not to the state’s system of tax rates but rather to
how income is sourced or allocated by the state. One reason
why it can be more difficult to apply the internal consistency
test to a state’s sourcing tax rules than to its tax rate structure
is that the rate structure is typically clear and well estab-
lished. In contrast, a state’s sourcing rules are often drafted
in an ambiguous and incomplete way that produces gaps in
guidance on how those rules are applied. In these circum-
stances, there can be substantial uncertainty as to where
various items of income are sourced. Nonetheless, even if a
state’s sourcing rules are unclear, the internal consistency
test provides a simple and powerful technique that courts
can use to ascertain whether the state’s tax laws are uncon-
stitutional. Likewise, administrators and courts can use the
same approach to resolve statutory ambiguities and enforce-
ment questions in ways that avoid constitutional violations.
Application of the internal consistency test — counter-
factual assumption of 50-state tax harmony — to sourcing
rules is similar to applying the internal consistency test to tax
rates but with a twist. As with tax rates, with sourcing rules
we compare (a) the domestic tax to (b) the sum of (1) the
inbound tax and (2) the outbound tax. The twist is that
since we cannot check for higher tax rates (because the
constitutional challenge does not involve rates), we must
instead look to how much income is subject to taxation.
Specifically, we compare (a) the portion of a purely domestic
taxpayer’s income allocated to the taxpayer’s state of domi-
cile with (b) the sum of (1) the portion of the taxpayer’s
cross-border income allocated to the challenged state and
(2) the portion the taxpayer’s of cross-border income allo-
cated to other states when they apply the challenged state’s
allocation rule under the 50-state harmony assumption.
That is, the court compares the (a) domestic allocation with
(b) the sum of (1) the inbound allocation and (2) the
outbound allocation.
In most cases, when a taxpayer operates exclusively in its
state of domicile, that state will tax 100 percent of its
income.32 Thus, in most cases (a) will be equal to 100
percent. This means that we can simplify our inquiry and
ask whether the following sum exceeds 100 percent of the
taxpayer’s income: (1) the taxpayer’s cross-border income
allocated to the challenged state plus (2) the taxpayer’s
cross-border income that other states would allocate to
themselves if they applied the challenged state’s allocation
rules.33 If the sum exceeds 100 percent, the challenged
state’s allocation rule fails the internal consistency test and
violates the dormant commerce clause. This makes sense; if,
29Under the harmony assumption, on cross-border income, tax-
payers would pay a tax of 1.25 percent to the state where the income
arose and a tax of 3.2 percent on their state of residence. Because there
were no credits, the total tax would be 4.45 percent.
30See, e.g., Georg W. Kofler and Mason, ‘‘Double Taxation: A
European Switch in Time?’’ 14 Colum. J. Eur’n L. 63, 88-94 (2007);
Mason, “Made in America for EuropeanTax:The Internal Consistency
Test,” 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1277, 1309-1319 (2008) [hereinafter Made];
Mason and Knoll, ‘‘What Is Tax Discrimination?’’ supra note 20, at
1105; and Mason and Knoll, Waiting, supra note 20, at 425-429.
31See, e.g., Mason and Knoll, Waiting, supra note 20, at 425-429.
See also Mason, Made, supra note 30 at 1309-1315. Id. at 1315 (‘‘the
internal consistency test, gives the court an overall [source and resi-
dence] perspective on how the income will be taxed. . . [while]
avoid[ing] the risk that interactions between particular. . . source rules
and particular. . . residence rules create the appearance of discrimina-
tion. . . or obscure discrimination’’).
32For a financial institution domiciled in Massachusetts that is
holding loans, the assumption that all of the institution’s economic
activity takes place in Massachusetts implies the following: The holder
(if it is physically located anywhere) is located in Massachusetts, the
borrowers are all located in Massachusetts, and all of the activities
relating to the loans, which is to say, ‘‘the solicitation, investigation,
negotiation, approval and administration of the loan[s]’’ takes place in
Massachusetts. Mass. G.L. Ann, 63 section 2A(e)(vi)(C).
33This test is equivalent to the uniformity rule we described above
and in our prior academic work. See Mason and Knoll, ‘‘What Is Tax
Discrimination?’’ 121 supra note 20, at 1076-85.
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under the 50-state harmony assumption (that is, under
internal consistency), a state’s allocation rules result in allo-
cation of more than 100 percent of a multistate enterprise’s
income, its law creates a preference for domestic over cross-
border commerce.
We illustrate this approach with the challenged regime in
First Marblehead. Because it is the only issue in the case, we
focus exclusively on the disputed property apportionment
rule. To test Massachusetts’s allocation rule for internal
consistency, on remand the Massachusetts court should add
(1) the portion of Gate’s income Massachusetts would allo-
cate to Massachusetts under the state’s property allocation
rule and (2) the portion of Gate’s income other states would
allocate to themselves using the challenged Massachusetts
property allocation rules. If that sum is more than all of Gate’s
income (that is, more than 100 percent), the challenged
sourcing rule fails the internal consistency test and violates
the dormant commerce clause.34
Putting numbers to this approach, we proceed as follows:
• The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court inter-
preted the challenged state allocation rule to allocate
all of Gate’s property to Massachusetts for the purpose
of calculating the property factor. Under our simplify-
ing assumption that this was the only factor in the
formula, that means that Massachusetts allocates to
itself 100 percent of Gate’s income.
• We next determine how much of Gate’s property other
states would allocate to themselves if they employed
the Massachusetts property allocation rule to Gate as a
non-domiciliary. This amount must be zero for the rule
to pass the internal consistency test. If, using allocation
rules identical to those of Massachusetts, another state
would allocate to itself any of Gate’s property, the
Massachusetts allocation rule is internally consistent
because it allocates more than 100 percent of Gate’s
income. Notice that this is just a restatement of the
uniformity rule we have described in our academic
work.35
Any internal inconsistency in Massachusetts law would
be a violation of the dormant commerce clause, even if no
other state taxed Gate and thus Gate suffered no actual
double taxation. Wynne makes that clear.36 Wynne also
makes clear that if the Massachusetts allocation rule passes
the internal consistency test, the Massachusetts rule passes
constitutional muster, even if Gate suffers actual double
taxation, for example because another state uses a different
allocation rule than Massachusetts.37 Thus, in light of
Wynne, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would
err if on remand it decides First Marblehead by checking to
see if Gate was subject to actual double taxation. That fact is
not relevant to the dormant commerce clause as interpreted
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wynne.
Getting back to the second step of our internal consis-
tency analysis, how would other states (counterfactually
applying Massachusetts law) apportion the loans held by
Gate, a company with an out-of-state domicile?38 Answer-
ing this question requires us to examine how Massachusetts
law treats loans held by non-domiciled companies. The
Massachusetts statute (described above) presumes that the
property is allocable to Massachusetts if the taxpayer’s do-
micile is in Massachusetts. Another state, say Connecticut,
applying Massachusetts law, would not apply the presump-
tion because Gate is not domiciled in Connecticut.
When the presumption does not apply, the Massachu-
setts statute says that a loan is considered to be located in the
state with which the loan has the preponderance of contacts,
a determination made on a case-by-case basis by considering
five factors: solicitation, investigation, negotiation, ap-
proval, and administration. The Massachusetts high court
already held that none of these factors applied in Gate
because Gate does not engage in any of the relevant activi-
ties. If that holding leads to the conclusion that, under the
counterfactual posed by the internal consistency test, Con-
necticut would not be able to allocate any of Gate’s loans to
itself under the Massachusetts allocation rules, the Massa-
chusetts formula would be internally consistent.
But this conclusion is not entirely clear. To satisfactorily
resolve the case by applying the internal consistency test, the
Massachusetts court must determine how the other states
would apply Massachusetts’s apportionment rule to Gate as
a nondomiciliary. The Massachusetts statute is unclear on
the point, and we are not familiar enough with state practice
to provide an answer with any confidence as to how Massa-
chusetts would tax a nondomiciliary that held loans taken
out by Massachusetts residents. Accordingly, we cannot say
whether Massachusetts’s method for calculating the prop-
erty factor of the apportionment formula for financial insti-
tutions is internally consistent and hence constitutional or
internally inconsistent and hence unconstitutional.
Although we are unsure which way First Marblehead
should come out on remand, Wynne and the internal con-
sistency test provide the lower courts with clear direction.
34Unless the Massachusetts apportionment formula can somehow
be justified, which is not an issue we address in this essay.
35Mason and Knoll, ‘‘What Is Tax Discrimination?’’ supra note 20,
at 1060-1074.
36Wynne, at 22-23.
37Wynne, at 22-23.
38Under the inquiry, the other state applies Massachusetts’s alloca-
tion rules, but even under the harmony assumption, no state except
Massachusetts can presumptively allocate to itself the loans on account
of Gate’s domicile, because Gate is domiciled only in Massachusetts.
So under the harmony constraint, the other states would look to
provisions of Massachusetts law that apply to non-domiciliaries to
determine how much of Gate’s income they can allocate to themselves.
It is crucial under the internal consistency test for the court to get an
overall — domestic, inbound, and outbound — view of the challenged
state’s tax system, and the internal consistency test facilitates that
perspective.
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What a court would need to know to apply the internal
consistency test and ascertain whether the Massachusetts
sourcing rules are constitutional as applied to Gate is how
Massachusetts treats the nondomiciliary situation when
Massachusetts non-domiciliaries hold loans that have con-
nections to Massachusetts.39
Final Observations
A state tax violates the dormant commerce clause when it
discourages cross-border commerce relative to in-state com-
merce. Determining whether a tax discourages cross-border
commerce calls for analysis of how a state taxes all of
domestic, inbound, and outbound commerce. This is as
true of apportionment rules as tax rates. We cannot ascertain
whether Massachusetts allocation rules discriminate against
interstate commerce by looking only at how those rules
apply to Massachusetts domiciliaries. Instead, we must also
determine how those rules would apply to similarly situated
non-domiciliaries. The internal consistency test aids the
courts in gaining the overarching perspective needed to
evaluate allocation rules in the same way it facilitates that
perspective on rates. Because the internal consistency test
effectively requires the reviewing court to apply the chal-
lenged state’s own rules to both insiders and outsiders while
eliminating from the inquiry the impact of any other state’s
rules, the test focuses the court’s attention where it should
be.40
As the above discussion suggests, the internal consistency
test also provides states with wide latitude in designing and
implementing their tax systems. States have great flexibility
in writing sourcing rules, but when it comes to drafting and
enforcing such rules, internal consistency formalizes the
principle ‘‘what is good for the goose is good for the gander.’’
Whatever sourcing rules (and presumptions and burdens of
proof and persuasion) apply when the state allocates income
to itself also when apportioning income to nondomicili-
aries. If that does not happen, then the state’s tax rules are
not internally consistent and therefore are presumptively
unconstitutional.
To make this point clear, note that Massachusetts could
have made the property factor allocation rule irrebuttable
and still maintained internal consistency. Thus, Massachu-
setts law could have said that if a financial institution lacks a
regular place of business and is domiciled in Massachusetts,
its loans are irrebuttably presumed to be in Massachusetts
for the purpose of calculating its property factor. However, if
that were the Massachusetts rule, the commonwealth would
not be able to allocate to itself any such loans for nondomi-
ciliaries. That is, when the tables were turned and Massa-
chusetts was determining how to tax a non-domiciliary with
no regular place of business, it could not allocate any of
those loans to itself.
It is also important to keep in mind that when sourcing
rules are examined in a piecemeal situational context, a
court cannot approve the sourcing rules against all chal-
lenges. It is possible for a state’s sourcing rules to be inter-
nally consistent regarding a specific situation but not an-
other situation. For example, the above discussion focused
on the sourcing rules when a financial institution did not
have a regular place of business. Even if Massachusetts had
the same set of written sourcing rules for financial institu-
tions that have a regular places of business as it does for those
without a regular place of business, Massachusetts might
apply those rules differently. In this circumstance, the Mas-
sachusetts rule as applied to financial institutions with a
regular place of business might be internally consistent, but
those same rules as applied to financial institutions without
a regular place of business might not be. Accordingly, the
determination of the internal consistency of those rules for
financial institutions lacking a regular place of business
would say nothing about the internal consistency of those
rules for financial institutions with a regular place of busi-
ness.
Also, courts will have to decide what to do about provi-
sions — like the following one from Massachusetts law —
that allow an administrative redetermination of the alloca-
tion in cases in which the statutory allocation does not
adequately reflect the taxpayer’s activities in the state:
if the provisions of subsections (a) to (f ), inclusive, are
not reasonably adapted to approximate the net in-
come derived from business carried on within the
commonwealth, a financial institution may apply to
the commissioner, or the commissioner may require
the financial institution, to have its income derived
from business carried on within this commonwealth
determined by a method other than that set forth in
subsections (a) to (f ), inclusive.41
39Massachusetts’s use of a preponderance of the evidence standard,
which is generally interpreted as meaning more likely than not (or just
over 50 percent), implies that the same standard (or a stricter standard)
must apply in the hypothetical nondomiciliary situation when the
taxpayer is domiciled outside Massachusetts if the Massachusetts law is
to be upheld. Similarly, the Massachusetts law provides a burden on the
taxpayer, although proof is only by a preponderance of the evidence,
which implies that in the converse situation Massachusetts would have
the burden of advancing to assert taxation of a non-domiciliary.
Internal consistency does not require that Massachusetts have a
preponderance of the evidence standard. Massachusetts could have
required, for example, clear and convincing evidence that the prepon-
derance of the contacts were with a state other than the state of the
taxpayer’s domicile. However, in that case internal consistency would
require in the converse case that Massachusetts establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the preponderance of the contacts were with
Massachusetts.
40See amicus brief cited, supra note 18; Mason and Knoll, Waiting,
supra note 20, at 425-429; Mason and Knoll, ‘‘Wynne: It’s Not About
Double Taxation,’’ supra note 22, at 415-422; and Mason, Made, supra
note 30, at 1307-1308, 1315-1316. 41Mass. Gen. L. Ann. 63 section 2A (g).
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Granting the taxpayer an option to request a reallocation
seems like it would be permissible under the dormant com-
merce clause, as long as the state administers it in a nondis-
criminatory fashion. But the existence of the opportunity to
request a reallocation should not shield state tax allocation
rules that are internally inconsistent. The Court of Justice of
the European Union has considered whether the availability
of administrative procedures to correct over-assessments
stemming from discriminatory taxation save the discrimi-
natory rule. The CJEU has held that such administrative
procedures cannot save discriminatory legislation, unless
the administration has no discretion not to cure the dis-
crimination.42 Moreover, the possibility that the state tax
commissioner would seek to reallocate the taxpayer’s in-
come creates legal uncertainty that may be subject to chal-
lenge under the dormant commerce clause as discriminatory
(if there is discretion that would allow the rule to be admin-
istered in a discriminatory fashion) or as an undue burden
on interstate commerce.
We make one final observation and a conjecture. The
internal consistency test is often misunderstood as a test for
double taxation. As a test for double taxation, it has been
criticized as poorly tailored and counterfactual. We have
argued,43 and the Supreme Court in Wynne agreed,44 that
internal consistency is not specifically a test for double
taxation but rather a test for discrimination. The two con-
cepts are distinct and overlap only sometimes.
One of the circumstances in which double taxation and
discrimination (that is, discouraging cross-border com-
merce) overlap is in evaluating challenges to sourcing rules.
The internal consistency test requires comparing (a) the
domestic tax treatment with (b) the sum of (1) inbound and
(2) outbound tax treatments. When all of a taxpayer’s
economic activity occurs in the state in which the taxpayer
resides or is domiciled (that is, in a purely domestic situa-
tion), all of the taxpayer’s income from that activity is
sourced (allocated) in the state of the taxpayer’s residence or
domicile. In other words, (a) is equal to 100 percent. Thus,
when the challenge is to the sourcing rules, we almost always
compare the sum of the inbound and outbound situations
to 100 percent. In these circumstances, the sourcing rule
passes the test if in the inbound plus outbound situation no
more than 100 percent of income is hypothetically taxed.
Thus, when the challenge is to the sourcing rules, the
internal consistency test is in effect a test for hypothetical
double taxation, but that is because when there is such
hypothetical double taxation, the state’s allocation rules
discourage interstate commerce. That is, it is a case of
discriminatory (hypothetical) double taxation. In situations
involving tax rates and the tax base, there is no such natural
correspondence because there is no natural baseline with
100 percent taxation.
The Supreme Court first developed the internal consis-
tency test to evaluate the constitutionality of allocation
rules. Only later did the internal consistency test become a
more general test for discrimination. Thus, the internal
consistency test developed in a context in which the concern
was closely connected with double taxation. We conjecture
that this might be one reason the internal consistency test is
so often mistakenly thought to be a test for double taxa-
tion. ✰
42Compare Biehl v. Administration des Contributions de Luxem-
bourg, C-175/88 (CJEU 1990) (Biehl I) (holding that the availability
of a procedure to seek a tax refund did not overcome the discriminatory
violation of the freedom of movement of workers inherent in denying
automatic refunds to nonresidents, in part because there was no
‘‘obligation on the Administration . . . to remedy in every case the
discriminatory consequences arising from the application of the na-
tional provision’’) with Safir v. Skattemyndighten, C-118/96 (CJEU
1998) (holding that a state’s requirement that a nonresident EU
national undergo an administrative proceeding to determine its en-
titlement to a tax benefit was not discriminatory, as long as the tax
administrator had no discretion to deny the benefit to qualified appli-
cants). See also Commission of the European Communities v. Luxem-
bourg, C-151/94 (CJEU 1995) (Biehl II) (holding that Luxembourg
had to amend its law to eliminate the restriction on the freedom of
movement found by the Court in Biehl I because a mere administra-
tive proceeding to remedy violations on a case-by-case basis was not
sufficient).
43See articles and brief cited in supra notes 18 to 22.
44Wynne, at 22-23.
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